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Myanmar’s junta chief Min Aung Hlaing (right) meets China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Naypyidaw on August 14. Photo: Myanmar Military Information Team/AFP

China pushes to secure Myanmar military a seat at the table as junta falters

  • Concerned by a potential power vacuum, Beijing is hoping to shape Myanmar’s trajectory as the generals’ grip weakens
Myanmar
As Myanmar’s military junta teeters on the brink of collapse, China is making a bold power play – nudging the war-torn nation towards elections in a bid, experts say, to install a predictable government that will protect Beijing’s interests.

The calculus is clear: with the junta haemorrhaging territory to a tenacious insurgency, China wants to ensure the military retains a seat at the table, no matter the outcome.

“They cannot win and indeed are losing at a rate they can never recover from,” said Zachary Abuza, a Southeast Asia expert and professor at the National War College in Washington, referring to Myanmar’s generals. “Beijing wants to ensure that the military still has a seat at the table.”

During a visit to Thailand this month, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said Beijing would support a democratic transition in Myanmar and would help “restore peace and stability” – a tacit acknowledgement that the junta’s grip on power is slipping.
Earlier, he met with the generals in Naypyidaw. Myanmar’s state media announced afterwards that China had promised technical support and aid for a census ahead of elections the military has vowed to hold next year.
Destroyed and damaged buildings are seen on August 10 in Lashio, Myanmar’s northern Shan State, following fighting between the military and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army. Photo: AFP

Yet Beijing’s gambit faces long odds. Ethnic armed groups and the National Unity Government (NUG), a coalition of exiled lawmakers established in the wake of the 2021 coup, are intent on the military’s “total defeat”, Abuza said – making them unlikely to participate in any junta-backed polls. And the military itself may balk at relinquishing control, despite its battlefield setbacks.

Earlier this month, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army announced it had captured the military’s key northeast command headquarters in Lashio – a major victory.

The seizure of the strategic city in northern Shan state marks the biggest win since the launch of “Operation 1027” last October, when the Three Brotherhood Alliance – a coalition of three ethnic armed groups – unleashed a coordinated offensive across the region.

China is growing increasingly “clear-eyed” about the regime’s tenuous grip on power, according to Abuza, who said Beijing now wants to ensure the military retains some representation in a future government, to preserve a degree of predictability.

“While Beijing might privately admit the opposition could win the civil war, it scares them,” Abuza said. “They can’t say how a democratic federal government that emerged from the thorough defeat of the military would act.”

Myanmar junta chief Min Aung Hlaing presides over a meeting in Nyapidaw in January. Analysts say his grip on power is slipping. Photo: Handout via Xinhua

China, which views Myanmar as a crucial node in its regional ambitions, was “naive” in thinking that junta chief Min Aung Hlaing would accept elections, he added.

Jason Tower, Myanmar country director at the United States Institute of Peace think tank, said Beijing’s concerns were clear to see in the Chinese foreign ministry statement released after Wang’s meeting with the head of Myanmar military.

“The public readout of the meeting signalled that China has growing concerns about the security of the China-Myanmar pipeline project, as well as the regime’s ability to secure Chinese interests,” he said, referring to Wang’s expressed hope that “the safety of Chinese personnel and projects” would be safeguarded.

Wang’s visit was aimed at emphasising stability in Myanmar and avoiding further escalation of the ongoing civil war, according to Yun Sun, a senior fellow and director of the China programme at the Stimson Centre in the US.

China has growing concerns about the security of the China-Myanmar pipeline project, as well as the regime’s ability to secure Chinese interests
Jason Tower, United States Institute of Peace

“To publicly state China’s preference is important as it sends a signal to all players [in the conflict],” she said. But whether the junta can actually hold elections as planned next year remains highly uncertain given the volatility of the situation on the ground.

Min Aung Hlaing has already signalled a piecemeal approach – vowing to hold polls first in areas deemed safe while trying to secure other conflict zones.

Citing the country’s troubled general election in 2010, Sun said the next vote is likely to be neither free nor fair, but she argues it should still take place. “The current political impasse needs a solution to turn over the page,” she said.

This echoes a familiar pattern in Myanmar’s turbulent history. Despite the United Nations’ concerns over the fairness of the 2010 election, the country’s political and economic climate did improve in the years that followed – with the release of democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, the lifting of sanctions, and a landmark visit by then-US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
China’s Wang Yi with his counterparts from Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam at a meeting in Bangkok on August 17. Photo: Xinhua

External forces

China’s Wang has made his country’s position crystal clear, reiterating during a meeting in Bangkok on August 16 with his regional counterparts that Myanmar must remain free from foreign interference and not be infiltrated by external forces.

According to analyst Sun, Wang was referring to Western nations, especially the United States, who have provided support to the NUG and ethnic armed groups.

“In the Chinese view, that support boosts the resistance’s ability to continue its armed conflicts with the military government,” she said.

But for Abuza, this was simply another case of China searching for a “bogeyman” to blame. The NUG and ethnic armies had actually received “little direct assistance” from the West, he said.

Representatives of the NUG hold a press conference in Quezon City, the Philippines, last month. Photo: EPA-EFE

Still, two US officials did make a point of virtually meeting with representatives from the NUG and organisations including the Karen National Union, Karenni National Progressive Party and Chin National Front on August 16 – the same day Wang met junta chief Min Aung Hlaing.

So who’s really playing both sides here? “No one plays the double game in Myanmar better than China. They have been supporting the junta while arming and assisting EROs along their border,” Abuza said, using an abbreviation to refer to the country’s ethnic armed groups.

As for the endgame, the stage is set for an intense geopolitical tug of war over Myanmar’s future.

“China seeks to prevent the internationalisation of the conflict and wants to maximise its chances of shaping the conflict in a direction favourable to its geostrategic interests in Myanmar,” said Tower of the United States Institute of Peace.

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