On the last day of the drills in the Taiwan Strait this time following Taiwanese leader William Lai Ching-te’s inauguration, Chinese and American military officials held a video call. That shows that China and the US had already established a crisis management mechanism to prevent the Taiwan conflict from escalating into a war.

The conflict and confrontation between China and the US didn’t stop after the summit but it changed in two important ways. First, for the worse – the United States has expanded its containment of China from technology decoupling to commercial protectionism … I think the trade dispute between China and the US will continue to worsen.

So what is the other relatively positive change? The two sides have reached an agreement to strengthen social exchanges, including between students, in second-track dialogues, and with academic exchanges. The social exchanges between China and the US have become more relaxed than in the previous year.

But the impacts will be different depending on who wins. If Biden wins, the bilateral relationship will basically continue along the same path as it does now. But if Trump wins – and the possibility of his winning is growing – the economic confrontation between China and the US will increase, and it will be even more serious than their disputes on security.

If Trump increases tariffs on Chinese products on a greater scale than Biden, China will definitely respond with its own measures. If [Washington] restricts imports of Chinese products, China can only impose a certain degree of restrictions on American products.

If Trump wins, what will China’s relations with the European Union look like?

As long as European countries distance themselves from the US strategically on the Gaza issue, their positions on this issue will inevitably be close to those of China. So the political conditions for improving relations between China and Europe will be better than when there was only the Ukraine war, an issue on which European countries are criticising China.

US allies have begun to prepare for this. Already this year, German Chancellor [Olaf Scholz] has visited China, and the dialogue between China, Japan and South Korea has resumed after 4½ years. The reason is obvious: they don’t think that Trump will confront China as strongly as Biden on security issues. In other words, the security protections provided by Trump to his allies will be much weaker than during the Biden era, so they know that they need to adjust the balance they keep between China and the US.

05:28

Should China be concerned about the latest Japan-Philippines security pact?

Should China be concerned about the latest Japan-Philippines security pact?

As the US’ main strategic competitor, China must be prepared too. I think China will also take the initiative to improve relations with US allies – probably not in terms of security. It is more likely that China will … emphasise economic and social relations with these countries. Because whether it’s Europe, Japan, South Korea or any other country, they still need the Chinese market.

The EU has launched investigations into alleged subsidies for China’s new energy products, such as electric vehicles. Do you think there is a way to manage these types of trade disputes?

Economic relations between China and US allies will not automatically improve just because the US has distanced itself from its allies on security. China still needs to do a lot of work on this.

The European Union is a good case in point. Regardless of the strategic relationship between China and the US, Europe tends to be more protective of the European market. Populism and protectionism are also on the rise.

I personally think that if China and countries in Europe want to resolve trade disputes, they have to focus on cooperation in new fields, rather than tit-for-tat retaliation against each other. For example, on electric cars, Europe may reconsider cooperation if it can explore joint work with China on production and make it profitable for European countries. If it imports more cars from China, it means it can export more parts for China to make electric cars. If it doesn’t import Chinese cars, China will produce less, and then it will also export less parts. It has to form such a relationship of interest that could possibly help improve economic relations between China and Europe.

Would you like to make a prediction about the China-US relationship over the next 10 years? How will the two countries compare in terms of economic, technological, and military strength?

In terms of international relations, the Israel-Gaza war will reduce the global political influence of the United States. This is already very obvious, because even its allies have to distance themselves from it on this issue. This will not change until the end of the war.

While US [international] relations will become worse, China’s [international] relations may not necessarily improve. But as the US’ strategic relations with other major powers will be undermined, the strategic balance between China and the US will become less favourable to the US.

In terms of comprehensive strength, China and the United States will widen their gaps with other countries over the next 10 years, given the economic size of China or the US is already four to seven times that of other major powers. The US’ GDP is at least seven times more than that of each major country, except China. If the US economy grows 1 per cent annually, countries other than China must grow at least 7 per cent to avoid widening the gap. This is impossible to achieve.

Then what about China? The GDP gap between other countries and China is at least four times, which means that … if China grows 2 per cent annually, these countries will need to grow 8 per cent to prevent the gap from widening. This is also only a slight possibility. It is not difficult for China to maintain at least 2 per cent annual growth – or more.

01:15

China posts 4.7% second-quarter growth, lower than expected

China posts 4.7% second-quarter growth, lower than expected

The result of this is the bipolar structure between China and the US will become more prominent.

Second, the GDP gap between China and the US in the next five years, from 2024 to 2029, is in danger of widening. Why? The gap between China and the US in AI and chip research and manufacturing is growing and these two things have a great impact on the future digital economy, something that both the Chinese and US economies are increasingly dependent on.

Another factor is that within the next five years, foreign and Chinese private investment in China may be smaller than foreign and American private investment in the US. So, the total investment in the US is larger than that of China, and the US gap with China in AI and chip research and development may also widen. As a result, China and the US’ GDP gap is in danger of widening.

In terms of defence spending, the US spends over US$900 billion per year. China spends less than 30 per cent of that. The US is also involved in wars and is amassing combat experience. So in the next five years, it is less possible for China to narrow the gap with the US in military strength.

During this period, I don’t think there is a big prospect of China closing the gap in strength with the US. But it is possible to stop the gap from widening. Can the gap between China and the US start to narrow again in this period? It’s possible, but it depends on whether China can make greater policy reform than the US.

So the idea of the rising East and the declining West might not be applicable?

There are two problems with saying “the East is rising and the West is declining”. First, it’s not clear who the East and the West are. Does the East include India, Brazil, South Africa, Vietnam, or Cuba? Does the East include Russia? Russia certainly does not see itself that way. So if we don’t know what the groups are, how do we know who is rising and who is declining?

Second, how do you judge a rise and decline? Does rapid GDP growth or a large share of the world’s GDP equate to a rise? Or is it faster improvements in technology? When we don’t know who the East and the West are and the criteria for rising and declining, I think this saying just reflects [some] people’s wishful thinking … What they wish will not be the reality – it depends on the change in comparative power.

If you simply define the East as China only and the West as the US only, in the 10 years from 2002 to 2012, China did indeed quickly narrow the gap with the US, in terms of GDP. But today it is no longer the case. If we compare the proportion of China and the US in the world’s total GDP in US dollars, it is not narrowing now, but widening.

If the world is going to become more bipolar in the next decade, how does that affect China’s policy of promoting a multipolar order?

The term “multipolarity” is not an objective description of the world – it is a wish, not a reality. Many countries want to advance multipolarisation, even the US. The US … does not say that [the world is] bipolar, because the US does not want to admit that China is on an equal footing with it. Other major countries also insist on multipolarisation, because they wish to be one pole of the world.

China hopes the world will become multipolar, so it says it will promote multipolarisation. However, the current trend towards a bipolar configuration is obviously far stronger than any country’s ability to stop it.

In any bipolar world, two superpowers will compete for the so-called middle-zone countries. [These countries] prefer not to take sides, to be nonaligned, thus, they can benefit from both. But when it comes to a unipolar world, they can’t use this strategy.

China’s policy on the Global South is different from – for example – India’s. China’s current policy is preventing itself from being excluded from the concept of the Global South. The Indian government’s policy is exactly the opposite – to exclude China from the concept of the Global South, to highlight that it is the most important representative of the grouping.

China hopes to promote this concept with Russia in multilateral organisations such as Brics, which do not include Western countries. [China hopes for] all of the non-Western organisations where it has membership in this concept of the Global South, so that it can naturally achieve its strategic goal of being part of this group.

On the war between Russia and Ukraine, is it possible that China could help broker peace talks?

Assuming Trump wins the election and takes office next year, if he changes US policy on Ukraine, direct negotiations will be possible. Because the US is Ukraine’s main military supporter, the military aid provided by Europe is not enough to support Ukraine in the long-term. In this case, a negotiation cannot be ruled out in 2025.

China is neither the initiator of the war nor a participant. It is unlike the European countries and the US which are actually indirectly involved in the war as providers of military aid. So, the role that China can play is not as big as theirs. China’s peacemaking is constructive, but it may not have much of a role to play in facilitating negotiations.

European countries often say that they hope China can exert influence on Russia. Do you think this expectation is too high?

When I visited Europe in April, many people asked me this question. I think they ask this question because they lack understanding of the basic law of international politics. Russia is a world nuclear power and a permanent member of the [UN] Security Council. How can China influence Russia to make any major policy changes? This is impossible. Israel is not a major power, although it has nuclear weapons, and it is not a permanent member of the Security Council. It is such a small country but European states plus the United States together cannot stop it from continuing the war in Gaza. It is beyond China’s capability to persuade Russia into peace.

I think that China does not believe Hamas and Fatah have to wait until after the war to discuss how they can reconcile, jointly manage, or form certain political relationships. China believes that it is possible now to encourage them to negotiate on their position on Gaza and how they will approach the Palestinian issue in the future.

This is why China invited Hamas and Fatah to hold talks in Beijing. I think this has created a starting point for reconciliation between the two sides. I don’t know whether this can eventually lead to a reconciliation between them and achieve joint management of the Gaza Strip, because the outcome of the negotiations depends not only on whether Fatah and Hamas can reconcile, but also on whether Israel and the US allow them to manage the region. So I’m afraid the negotiations would need to be pushed through in a more multilateral international setting.

Many say that the possibility of a conflict in the South China Sea is greater than that in the Taiwan Strait. What do you think?

The Taiwan issue is now less likely to cause military conflict between China and the US because the two countries have a management mechanism. The military conflict in the Taiwan Strait has been controlled, so now everyone has shifted to discussing the South China Sea issue. Both issues have the risk of igniting a conflict accidentally, but there is no risk of it escalating into a war between China and the US.

You can see that since 1991, there have been many small-scale military conflicts in East Asia, including in the South China Sea, but there has been no war between countries in this region. It has been 33 years since then, so I think China and the US are capable of preventing the possibility of small-scale military conflicts or accidents from escalating into wars in East Asia.

There is some debate that Russia is a higher priority for North Korea than China, bringing Moscow and Pyongyang closer together. How do you see it?

North Korea’s economic and military strength is so small that the support it can provide to Russia is very limited, whether it’s on the battlefield, in economic development, or in terms of international influence. For Russia, North Korea’s support is better than nothing but it has no substantive significance. Similarly, Russia is now going all out in the war, so it is also unable to provide decisive and large-scale support to North Korea.

03:05

Putin, Kim sign ‘strongest ever’ defence treaty amid growing tensions with the West

Putin, Kim sign ‘strongest ever’ defence treaty amid growing tensions with the West

So in this sense, no matter how the relationship between the two sides develops, North Korea’s and Russia’s need for China is far greater than their mutual need for each other. So this determines that [no matter] what kind of relationship they develop, the relationship between North Korea and China, and the relationship between Russia and China will not be significantly affected.

Has denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula fallen in the list of China’s diplomatic priorities?

For China, our security focus on the Korean peninsula depends on what is happening on the ground. Different problems have led to different crises at different times, and you always have to tackle the most urgent ones first.

The biggest source of instability for now is US policy, and the increasing military exercises between the US, Japan and South Korea. North Korea has not had a nuclear test for several years. Its nuclear weapons may not be a positive factor but they aren’t the most direct cause of the current instability on the Korean peninsula.

[Both North Korea and the US] have an impact on regional instability, but the US factor is now bigger, more direct and more urgent.

Do you think the military alliance between the US, Japan and South Korea will increase their “deterrence” against North Korea and China?

I think there may be some shifts if Trump takes office, because the United States is already involved in the wars in Gaza and Ukraine. Is it good for the US to provoke a third military conflict in East Asia? It is in trouble both at home and abroad. So why would Trump follow Biden’s policies and get himself into the same trouble?